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Introduction 
Recognising elements of a ‘modern’ mind, or complex cognition, in Stone Age archaeology is 
difficult and often disputed. A key question is whether, and in which way Homo sapiens thinking 
differs from that of other Homo species/sub-species. We argue that if the question of whether the 
modern mind is different from that of our ancestors or other members of the Homo family is to 
be fully explored, some focus should fall on technologies and behaviours unique to H. sapiens. 
Here we hypothesise about one such techno-behaviour, i.e., bow hunting (Fig. 1). This is 
different from, for example, symbolic behaviour for which there is also evidence amongst the 
Neanderthals (Mellars 2010). Other technologies and their associated behavioural repertoires, 
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such as the heat treatment of rocks to improve knapping properties and hunting with snares 
represent similar opportunities to explore the cognition of early H. sapiens (Wadley 2010, 2013).   
 
Archaeology of bow hunting, bridging theory and cognitive interpretation 
Archaeological evidence for bow hunting is thus far exclusive to H. sapiens (Shea & Sisk 2010), 
never having been found in association with other remembers of our family. Bow hunting was 
long thought of as a recent, Holocene, invention. But new evidence from southern Africa is 
pushing the innovation back to between 37 000 and 65 000 years ago (Backwell et al. 2008; 
Lombard & Phillipson 2010; d’Errico et al. 2012; Robbins et al. 2012), perhaps even to 71 000 
years ago (McBrearty 2012). In the southern African context, we know that the techno-behaviour 
is associated with H. sapiens, because from at least 100 000 years ago humans here were 
anatomically modern, and features of the DNA profile of populations currently living in the 
region can also be traced back to at least 100 000 years ago (see Lombard et al. 2013 for cross-
disciplinary overview). The antiquity of the finds indicate that bow-and-arrow technology could 
be relevant for investigating cognitive evolution.  
 
Archaeological assessments of prehistoric cognition must rest on a series of bridging arguments 
(Botha 2010; Wynn 2009; Wadley 2013; Haidle 2014) (Fig. 2). In the case of bow hunting, 
archaeological data (A), consist mostly of stone/bone tools. The technical system (C) is inferred 
using artefact attributes and functional interpretations. Inferring the technical system from the 
archaeological evidence requires an explicit justification, or in Botha’s terms, it requires that the 
argument be warranted. Here the warrant rests on Southern African ethnographic evidence of 
microliths used as arrow tips, and the temporal extension of this evidence into Later Stone Age 
assemblages, including actual stone-tipped arrows (Binneman 1994). This link in the inference 
chain is uncontroversial and is accepted by virtually all archaeologists of the South African Stone 
Age. A detailed reconstruction and analysis of perceptions and actions in the problem-solution 
sequences of manufacture and use of a bow-and-arrow set (Lombard & Haidle 2012) address the 
next bridging argument (C-D-E) (Fig. 3). These sequences describe how the activities were 
organized and what artisans had to know, conceive and do, to accomplish their goals (see Haidle 





The final bridge in a cognitive interpretation is an argument about the cognitive systems 
underpinning the different reconstructed activities. Many self-described cognitive interpretations 
skip this step, assuming that the number of elements and steps in a problem-solution sequence is 
somehow a direct measure of cognition. We emphasize that technical complexity may be the 
result of a variety of cognitive processes, the probability and plausibility of which has to be 
discussed in the interpretative process; but, although interdependent with cognitive 
performances, technical complexity is part of a behavioural pattern and cannot be a direct 
measure of anything cognitive. To argue about cognition, it is necessary to introduce a 
knowledge of cognitive systems. Thus, the final bridging argument (E-F-G) must be built by 
linking archaeological features to explicit hypotheses of cognition (Garofoli & Haidle 2014). The 
strength of the final inference rests on the power of the cognitive hypotheses employed and the 
success in linking technical components to components of the hypothesis. Strict parsimony must 
apply. The simplest cognitive system that can account for archaeological features must be given 
priority. 
 
Expert cognition and bow-and-arrow technology 
Teasing apart bow-and-arrow technology demonstrates an elaborate craft production, equivalent 
in its basic organization to current craft production such as blacksmithing (Keller & Keller 
1996). Primary among these similarities is the overarching hierarchical outline of the task. There 
was clearly a large-scale goal and plan – the functioning system – that can be broken down into a 
number of more or less self-contained technical units or modules (Lombard & Haidle 2012). The 
cognitive requirements for the modules are rather different from those required to coordinate the 
entire task, and it is appropriate to treat them separately. Execution of the individual modules 
relies primarily on the resources of expert cognition (Ericsson & Knitch 1995; Ericsson & 
Delaney 1999). An expert performance has several attributes that distinguishes it from other 
activities: 
1) Rapid problem assessment, 
2) Rapid switching to alternative solutions when required, 
3) Almost error-free execution, 
4) Attention switching to other tasks without loss of information, 
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5) Restriction to a narrow range of expertise, 
6) Years of practice to acquire mastery. 
 
Expertise includes domains such as chess, sport, musical performance, and medical diagnosis 
(Ericsson & Delaney 1999) but is also at play in technical activities (Wynn & Coolidge 2004, 
2010). An essential component to all expert performance is practice. Practice is essential because 
expertise relies on well-learned sequences of knowledge and action, constructed using two 
cognitive short cuts – chunking and chaining. Chunking involves dividing bodies of information 
or actions into smaller, more easily processed chunks. Chunks are then chained together into 
longer sequences by repetition; often a final element in one chunk acts as a cue for the initial 
element in the next. This organization is true for both verbal and procedural information and is 
most familiar in the motor routines of sport and instrumental music performance. Chunking and 
chaining must be learned by repetition.  
 
This cognitive system is difficult to access via conscious attention, and the chunks and cues 
cannot be learned by volition. But expertise is not exclusively a domain of chunking and 
chaining and procedural cognition. Working memory (WM) plays a role, as most clearly 
described in the model of long-term working memory (LTWM) (Ericsson & Delaney 1999). 
Again cues are the key. The expert acquires a long chain of information through practice, and 
then attaches a kind of access button to it – a cue. When he or she retrieves the cue into WM, it 
instantly accesses all the information to which it has been linked (e.g., a chess opening such as 
‘Sicilian defense’). One of the essential tasks in acquiring expert ability is assembling clusters of 
cues, referred to as a retrieval structure (Ericsson & Delaney 1999). An expert learns a huge 
number of retrieval structures, tied to almost every conceivable variation in the task condition. 
As a form of cognition, expertise is almost certainly old in an evolutionary sense. Chunking and 
chaining are old learning mechanisms, as is cueing. The size of expert knowledge is limited 
primarily by the size of long term memory. WM capacity is relevant only in the number of 
retrieval structures one can access at once, or probably more important for our current topic, the 




Each of the technical modules of the bow and arrow could easily be learned via expert cognition. 
Within each phase the steps are chunks of procedure chained together, and the shifts in attention 
are similarly organized into a sequence, one cueing the next. Even the phases themselves can be 
executed in this string-of-beads manner (Gatewood 1985). Flexibility is built into the procedure. 
There are, for instance, at least four alternative ways to bend the stave (Lombard & Haidle 
2012). Variation in local conditions and personal history cue the appropriate sequence of actions. 
The more staves the artisan produces, the more automatic the cognitive retrieval structure 
becomes. Decisions thus increasingly require less attention, i.e., less occupation of WM capacity. 
Producing a bow stave is a classic example of expert cognition at work. Even during the 
application of learned modules when the stave is fitted with a string to produce a composite tool, 
the bow falls easily within the domain of expertise.  
 
This kind of thinking is not a recent evolutionary acquisition. It was well within the cognitive 
range of Neanderthals and all early forms of H. sapiens. Elements of chunking and chaining, and 
thus expertise, can be traced back to early stone tool production at least 2.6 million years ago 
(Semaw et al. 2003). It is probable that an increase in LTWM capacity accompanied the 
transition from Homo erectus to Homo heidelbergensis (this would be consistent with increase in 
brain size), but basic expert cognition would appear to have evolved much earlier. We suspect 
that even H. heidelbergensis could have learned to execute most, if not all, of the isolated 
modules associated with producing a bow and arrow. But we also aver that they probably could 
not have invented a bow and arrow, and almost certainly could not have conceived of, and 
organized, the entire system. Something more than expertise is required. 
 
Episodic memory and bow hunting 
It is impossible to detect how bow-and-arrow technology was first invented. Parsimony requires 
that we assume the simplest form of innovation was in play. In technology this involves 
fortuitous mistakes, or attentive small modifications of known procedures. Both rely on free 
attention space in WM, that is, someone needed to ‘notice’ the fortuitous mistake or alternate 
step (Wynn & Coolidge in press). There is no reason to deny this ability to early H. sapiens, 
Neanderthals or H. heidelbergensis. The bow and arrow required many innovations, and they 
may have occurred over a shorter time span than innovations in stone-tipped spears, suggesting 
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that more people had excess WM capacity, or that there was a greater excess of capacity. But 
there is something about the bow-and-arrow system as a whole that implies an important 
development in cognition – bow-and-arrow manufacture requires a much longer temporal 
extension of activity, stretching consideration of forthcoming conditions much further into the 
future. The evidence here comes not from the technical modules themselves, but from the 
overarching plan of a complementary set of different composite tools as summarized in the 
effective chain of thought and action (Fig. 3).   
 
To produce and operate an effective bow-and-arrow system, one must be able to access the entire 
system in attention, at least occasionally. Both elements, bow and arrow, need not only 
adjustment to the final goal, but have also to be conceived in relation to each other. If an arrow is 
made, not only the peculiarity of the envisaged prey is taken into account, but also the specificity 
of the bow as a technological complement. Without this, one could not plan to acquire the 
disparate elements necessary for the different modules, or make sure that required materials were 
available. And the best way to do this is to place oneself in an imagined future state and evaluate 
the imagined future situation. Expertise cannot do this. It cannot account for the reactivation of 
all the modules over temporal and spatial gaps. A more specific cognitive model candidate for 
the understanding of this scale of the technology is that of episodic memory. We propose that 
episodic memory is directly linked to bow-and-arrow use and may be considered a necessary, but 
not sufficient, condition. 
 
Episodic memory allows for the recall of past experiences (Tulving 2002; Tulving & Kim 2007). 
When people recall a past event, they mentally travel back in time. However, they are aware that 
the conscious re-experience of the event is qualitatively different from the initial experience of 
that event. Thus, episodic memory involves the recollection of events and other elements 
associated with those events (event clusters), involving a special kind of awareness that if events 
can be re-imagined, and even modified (consciously or unconsciously), then time itself is 
subjective. The conscious awareness of one’s self in a past memory and/or one’s conscious 
manipulation of a past memory is what Tulving referred to as autonoetic awareness. Tulving 
further hypothesized episodic memory was a recently evolved phenomenon and is probably 





Humans do share this kind of memory with most animals, but at some point in recent human 
evolution, true episodic memory evolved and hominins became unique. Earlier hominins were 
probably capable of acquiring and using these past events (i.e., knowledge). Tulving (2002) 
proposed that they could solve present problems based on past experiences, but that they were 
probably unaware that they were doing so. Here, we might elaborate upon our reference to ‘true’ 
episodic memory. Although the terms episodic memory and autobiographical memory are often 
bandied about as synonymous, we would propose that autobiographical memory is a subset of 
the broader category of episodic memory, the latter of which is certainly characteristic of many 
animal species (e.g., Allen & Fortin 2013). Autobiographical memory, however, involves a clear 
sense of one’s self in the event’s recall; it may be unique to H. sapiens and recently evolved.  
 
Episodic memory is not perfect. It is not reproductive, but it is constructive, and it is therefore 
subject to all kinds of errors and illusions (Schacter 1999). It may be that these imperfections of 
the episodic memory system may well have led to the ‘fortuitous’ mistakes we referred to earlier 
in the simplest forms of innovation. Numerous examples reside in the literature of these 
inaccuracies including the well-documented vagaries of eye-witness testimony and 
confabulations, where people intentionally or unintentionally mix the past with both fact and 
fiction often without a complete awareness of doing so. Thus, it has long been noted that 
episodic memory is “fundamentally constructive, rather than reproductive” (Schacter 1999; 
Addis et al. 2007; Schacter & Addis 2007; Addis et al. 2009). Schacter and Addis (2007) 
consequently proposed a constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, which allows for the 
recombination of past details or imagined events in the future into novel configurations. These 
simulations can recall past events in a highly flexible manner in order to enhance the success of 
immediate or distant future actions.  
 
Schacter and Addis (2007) reasoned that, as the future is not an exact representation of the past, 
the ability to simulate future events must be inherently flexible in order to recall, extract, and 
recombine aspects of past events to ensure the success of future actions. Their concept of 
constructive episodic simulation may be the critical cognitive component for bow-and-arrow 
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technology as well as its ‘inexact’ nature, as we referred to earlier. Their concept may support 
our key bridging argument for the nature of a cognitive system as a whole, which can activate, 
deactivate, and reactivate expertise modules over temporal and spatial spans.  
 
Tentatively bridging cognitive and neural spheres 
It has been proposed that a sense of self and self-representation may have its neurological 
foundations in the superior medial parietal lobes, i.e., the precuneus (Lou et al. 2004). Again, it 
may be no mere coincidence that episodic memory has also been linked to the precuneus as well 
as prefrontal regions and medial temporal regions (e.g, Schacter & Addis 2007; Schacter et al. 
2007). We have already intimated this interrelationship between recalling the past, simulating the 
future, and one’s sense of self (although perhaps the latter is not a necessary condition but it may 
well be) may rest upon similar neuronal substrates (e.g., Okuda et al. 2003), particularly the 
precuneus (Addis et al. 2007, Buckner & Carroll 2007; Spreng & Grady 2010).  Provocatively, 
Bruner has recently found evidence for precuneal expansion in recent H. sapiens not shared by 
Neanderthals (Bruner 2004, 2010). 
 
Conclusion 
It appears that the cognitive requirements for bow-and-arrow technology, or those that are 
operated ‘out of sight, but not out of mind’ such as snares (Wadley 2010), may have required a 
fully modern episodic memory system: a cognitive system that is capable not only of 
autobiographical memory retrieval, but also of constructive episodic memory simulations. If the 
latter suppositions find further support, then the early makers of bow-and-arrow technologies in 
all likelihood possessed a fully autonoetic awareness. The latter conclusion may also be bolstered 
by a recent finding that, in an event-queuing paradigm, it is unlikely that future prospection relies 
solely upon autobiographical/episodic memory networks (D’Argembeau & Demblon 2012). 
D’Argembeau and Demblon argue their findings strongly suggest that personal goals, which rely 
upon personal abstract knowledge, provide an important framework for the overall organization 
of imagined events. Thus, future imagined events “may be linked together in broader event 
sequences on the basis of their causal roles in achieving personal goals” (Tulving 2002:166). 
Finding evidence for a sense of self in the archaeological record is a Herculean task. However, 
recent work (D’Argembeau & Mathy 2011; D’Argembeau & Demblon 2012), which 
9 
 
demonstrates that a personal sense of self and awareness of one’s goals is critical to linking and 
organizing successful future simulations, may provide a tenuous basis for a near modern or fully 
modern sense of self and autonoetic thinking, possibly before 60,000 years ago.  
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Figure 1: San man hunting with bow and arrow, Kalahari, Northern Cape, South Africa (photograph used 




Figure 2: Graphic representation of a series of bridging arguments for archaeological assessment of 






Figure 3: Hypothetical, effective thought-and action chain for a bow and stone-tipped arrow 
reconstructed from experimental, archaeological and ethnographic information (adapted from Lombard & 
Haidle 2012). 
 
 
